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“Dig a hole and bury the past in it”: reconciliation and the heritage of 
genocide in Cambodia 
 
By Colin Long and Keir Reeves 
 
We first visited Anlong Veng in November 2005, arriving from Thailand 
through the border crossing at Sa Ngam, on a drizzly, surprisingly cool day. 
The border crossing is a ramshackle collection of huts and small traders’ stalls 
lining a muddy path. It has a distinct backwoods, isolated feel, understandable 
given it was only opened for legal transit in November 2003, and links 
Thailand’s Sisaket province to one of the most under-developed areas in 
Cambodia, which was until 1999 controlled by remnants of the Khmer Rouge. 
The presence of sand-bagged machine gun nests on the Thai side of the 
border only adds to the sense of entering a wild, possibly dangerous place. 
 
Given that the only other people crossing the border when we arrived were 
Cambodians in the back of pick-ups, heads swathed in krama, the ubiquitous 
scarf of Cambodian peasants, our presence caused some bemusement 
among the border guards, especially since we were on foot. A Cambodian 
border policeman offered us a lift (for a fee) to Anlong Veng, some  
15kms away, and since there was no other obvious means of going any 
further (certainly no public transport), we gratefully accepted. 
 
The border crossing is at the top of the Dangrek escarpment, near the 
remains of a number of residences of former Khmer Rouge leaders, including 
Pol Pot, a military post of the area’s former Khmer Rouge commander, Ta 
Mok, and Pol Pot’s grave site itself. The road to Anlong Veng is currently 
under construction, and on this day was little more than a mud slide, 
negotiable by only the most skilled drivers in four wheel drives; fortunately our 
border policeman was one of those. 
 
Our impressions of the frontier crossing, and our perilous descent down the 
mountain, created a sense of anticipation that bordered on foreboding which 
was dramatically heightened when we stopped at Ta Mok’s house on the 
outskirts of Anlong Veng town. Ta Mok was, during the period of Khmer 
Rouge control of Cambodia (the period of Democratic Kampuchea), a 
member of the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee and the 
Secretary of the southwest zone and later of the north/central zone, as well as 
Chief of the General Staff (Fawthrop and Jarvis, 2005: 264). After the 
Vietnamese ousted the Khmer Rouge in 1979, Khmer Rouge forces retreated 
to six areas mostly bordering Thailand, from where they received Thai, 
Chinese and western support to continue an insurgency that wreaked 
immense destruction on Cambodia until the final demise of the movement in 
1999. Ta Mok, whose reputation for ruthlessness is reflected in the moniker 
‘The Butcher’, took control of the band of mountains to the north of Siem 
Reap, with his headquarters at Anlong Veng. As other Khmer Rouge 
strongholds fell or surrendered to government forces in the 1990s, the 
remaining Khmer Rouge leaders, including Pol Pot and Democratic 
Kampuchea defence minister, Son Sen, joined Ta Mok at Anlong Veng.  
 
Here the Khmer Rouge leaders, increasingly isolated and desperate, fell on 
each other for one last time. Nothing if not consistent, the small band of 
surviving leaders embarked on a final round of violent purges in 1997: Pol Pot 
ordered the murder of Son Sen and his family, which in turn sparked Mok to 
arrest the former Brother Number One and subject him to a people’s court. 
Duly convicted, Pol Pot was sentenced to house arrest and died the following 
year in a hut near today’s border crossing (Short, 2004: Ch. 12). His body was 
hastily cremated and his ashes heaped into a pile, with a scrappy corrugated 
iron roof to protect it from the rain, and bottles planted in the earth as a 
border. It is a tawdry monument to one of the greatest murderers of the 
twentieth century. 
 
Ta Mok’s house is the most intact and substantial of the 28 tourist-historical 
sites in the Anlong Veng area. In fact the house compound consists of three 
structures on a man-made isthmus jutting into a lake that Mok created by 
damming a stream. At the entrance to the isthmus is the Anlong Veng 
Tourism Office, housed in a wooden hut and infrequently open. 
 
Our vehicle jolted to a halt in a grove of trees beside Ta Mok’s house. Several 
young men sidled up to us, one engaging our driver while another sought four 
dollars from us as an entrance fee. One of the men was soon identified to us 
as a guide and we followed him towards the buildings. Just in front of the main 
house is a large open-sided shed with a concrete floor, where several people 
squatted in conversation, casting us frowning glances. Here, too, were two 
small steel cages, recognisable from news footage and photos in books as 
the ‘tiger cages’ used by the Khmer Rouge as jungle prison cells (on a 
subsequent visit a guide confirmed that they had been used to hold people, 
but only ‘traitors’ to the Cambodian nation). 
 
As we entered the house a most extraordinary scene developed. A mini-van 
pulled up amongst the trees, disgorging a wedding party – bride, bridesmaid, 
groom, best man and groomsman – all clad in improbably impeccable white. 
Our guide ushered us into Ta Mok’s house. The place is a rough two storey 
concrete and timber structure with tiled floors and almost devoid of furniture. 
In fact its only decoration consisted of four naïve murals which betray much of 
the essence of the Khmer Rouge’s ideology. On the first floor, an end wall 
features a peeling mural of Angkor Wat portraying an idyllic Khmer society 
against the backdrop of a lurid sun-rise. Upstairs a colourful map of Cambodia 
painted on a wall shows the country divided into provinces; neighbouring 
Thailand and Laos are indicated, but southern Vietnam, what is known to the 
Cambodians as Kampuchea Krom and was, until the 18th century, part of the 
Cambodian kingdom, is a grey, unidentified wasteland. Flanking the map are 
other murals, one of a jungle scene and another of what is taken to be the 
nearby temple of Preah Vihear. The absence of readily-identifiable ideological 
symbols seems at first glance rather odd, until one remembers that, 
particularly in its latter days, the Khmer Rouge tried to portray itself above all 
else as the defender of an historic Khmer essence (hence Angkor Wat, the 
temple and the jungle) against the depredations of aggressive foreigners – 
chiefly the Vietnamese. 
 
We noticed the wedding party entering the house where they began to pose in 
front of the murals for photographs. We asked the bride if we could take some 
photos of her too, but she turned away unsmilingly, and the party continued to 
ignore us. A number of men loitered apparently aimlessly about the house. 
They were clearly not visitors, but what exactly was their association with the 
site was unclear. Their presence was somewhat unsettling.  
 
At this instant something akin to a tempest sprung up, slashing across the 
lake and driving sheets of rain horizontally through the open windows of the 
house. The bizarreness of the scene – a photoshoot of a wedding party in the 
former house of a man in prison awaiting trial on charges of genocide, sullen 
men loitering, and an atmospheric sound and light show courtesy of the 
weather – provided an interpretative experience of this site of pain and shame 
that no museum curator could ever hope to create. 
 
The storm quickly passed, and within minutes the grey tranquillity of this 
strange Cambodian day had returned.  
 
‘Why’, we asked our guide, ‘would people wish to have their wedding photos 
taken in such a place?’  
‘Because’, he replied, ‘they think that Ta Mok was a good man, who provided 
much for the local people’.  
‘And what’, we asked, ‘do you think of Ta Mok?’  
‘Yes, he was a good man’. 
‘And do you know where he is now?’ 
‘Yes, he is in Tuol Sleng prison’.1
 
Our sense of unease was rapidly turning to a feeling of repulsion as we 
realised that we were surrounded by unreconstructed former Khmer Rouge 
cadre – had the wedding party, we wondered, so resplendent in white in an 
area otherwise caked in a brown layer of mud and poverty, been the children 
of high-ranking Khmer Rouge leaders who still live in the area? 
 
We examined the rest of the site quickly, not daring to enter the foul-stinking 
rooms under the houses – were they garages or bomb shelters, as our guide 
suggested, or prison cells, as our driver thought? – and, the feeling of 
ghoulishness becoming overwhelming, decided to leave. 
 
Does Anlong Veng, we pondered as our driver cheerfully raced us towards 
Siem Reap, offer anything worthwhile to the visitor seeking understanding and 
commemoration of the Khmer Rouge genocide? 
 
Subsequent visits to Anlong Veng produced similar experiences: the same 
sense of a tragic past being exploited with little thought or care, the void 
created by a lack of interpretation filled by uneducated former Khmer Rouge 
with their own highly distorted understanding of Cambodian history. The 
questions inevitably arise: why is Anlong Veng being developed as a tourist 
attraction? Does the preservation of these former Khmer Rouge sites help in 
                                                 
1 In fact Ta Mok died in captivity just seven months after this visit, apparently from a stroke. 
the understanding and commemoration of Cambodia’s traumatic history? Why 
do we want to preserve such sites? To prevent forgetting? To aid in 
reconciliation? Can sites like Anlong Veng perform the latter role? In 
traumatised societies what is most important – justice or reconciliation? If the 
latter, does the preservation of sites of trauma help in achieving 
reconciliation? 
 
In the most prosaic sense, the development of Anlong Veng as a tourist-
historic site is part of an attempt by the Cambodian government to reintegrate 
the area back into a nation finally at peace. It is part of an economic 
development program that has also seen the area opened up by roads, 
especially the one linking the town to Cambodia’s tourist epicentre at Siem 
Reap, the location of the Angkor World Heritage site, and the creation of a 
border crossing with Thailand. It is envisaged that Anlong Veng will eventually 
sit astride an overland route from Bangkok to Siem Reap.  
 
Although Anlong Veng is only a few hours by road from Siem Reap, its 
isolation from the project to rebuild the national community after the collapse 
of the Khmer Rouge regime in the face of the 1978 Vietnamese invasion 
should not be under-estimated. Together with Pailin and other Khmer Rouge 
holdouts until the 1990s, Anlong Veng still remains tenuously integrated into 
the nation. Ex-Khmer Rouge officials retain positions of authority in all former 
Khmer Rouge strongholds, and a large proportion of Anlong Veng’s 
population consists of ex-Khmer Rouge cadre or soldiers. If the development 
of the town’s heritage sites is intended to reintegrate it into the national 
historical discourse, it is not very successful. 
 
If the Cambodian People’s Party Government in Phnom Penh hopes to 
reintegrate Anlong Veng into the nation, what message does it want portrayed 
through the area’s heritage sites, and is that message being adequately 
conveyed? Here we must briefly touch on a debate that is of overwhelming 
importance to contemporary Cambodia: the debate about the correct 
response to the Khmer Rouge (Linton, 2004). Which is more important to 
contemporary Cambodia – justice or reconciliation? Since its earliest days, 
the PRK regime, and subsequently the government of the CPP, offered the 
hand of reconciliation to Khmer Rouge who were prepared to abandon 
opposition to the government and renounce their involvement with Pol Pot’s 
forces.  
 
Large numbers of low level Khmer Rouge soldiers and cadre took up the 
opportunity, the desertions increasing rapidly into the 1990s as Prime Minister 
Hun Sen offered amnesty to remaining Khmer Rouge leaders if they brought 
their forces back into the national fold. Although Pol Pot himself was never 
offered amnesty, other extremely high-ranking Khmer Rouge leaders 
benefited from a policy that offered to forget their pasts if they ‘sincerely 
reformed’ and ‘created feats on behalf of the Revolution’ (that is, on behalf of 
the PRK regime) (from the decree-law establishing a ‘Revolutionary People’s 
Trial of the Genocide Crime of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary Clique’, cited in Heder, 
2002: 190). 
 
On the surface the amnesty policy appears to have been very successful in 
breaking the back of the Khmer Rouge insurgency, and the organisation, 
deserted by most of its leaders and their troops, finally collapsed in 1999. But 
considerable disquiet remains, both inside Cambodia, and particularly within 
the international human rights advocacy system, about the absence of any 
judicial accounting for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge (Linton, 2004; Fawthrop 
and Jarvis, 2005). By abandoning the Khmer Rouge in its dying days, despite 
decades of service to its murderous program, leaders such as Nuon Chea 
and Khieu Samphan have managed to avoid any punishment for their actions. 
Hun Sen has argued that achieving peace and national ‘reconciliation’ is more 
important than a strict judicial accounting and punishment for perpetrators. 
Just what Hun Sen means by ‘reconciliation’, however, is rather problematic. 
His definition appears to consist of ‘integration’ of the former Khmer Rouge 
back into the nation and the absence of armed conflict. Having achieved this 
reconciliation, he believes that the proper treatment of the country’s traumatic 
history is to ‘dig a hole and bury the past in it’ (Linton, 2004, p. 12). Given that 
Cambodia’s history of genocide is most starkly manifested in the familiar 
images of exhumed mass graves, Hun Sen’s words are insensitive at best, 
somewhat sinister at worst. 
 
In deciding how to deal with the Khmer Rouge past, the government has paid 
scant attention to the wishes of the Cambodian people. Surveys have 
consistently shown a desire on the part of ordinary Cambodians for some sort 
of trial process. In contrast to this, the government’s attitude to the Khmer 
Rouge has been confusing for ordinary Cambodians. On the one hand they 
are told that the Khmer Rouge were responsible for the most heinous crimes. 
On the other they are told that reconciliation with them is the price of peace, 
even if ‘reconciliation’ means digging a hole and burying the past in it (Linton, 
2004).  
 
Confusion about approaches to the past is replicated in sites of remembrance 
in Cambodia. The major site of commemoration is Tuol Sleng, the Khmer 
Rouge prison and torture centre in suburban Phnom Penh, and its associated 
killing field at Choeung Ek, on the edge of the city. Both sites are powerfully 
confronting. Both were established as places of commemoration by the 
Vietnamese when they displaced the Khmer Rouge in 1979. One of their very 
clear functions was to display to a world – except for the Soviet Union and its 
allies – that was opposed to Vietnam’s intervention the horrors of the Khmer 
Rouge regime that the Vietnamese had brought to an end. Just as the PRK 
and CPP would subsequently do, the interpretation at the sites sought to 
blame a small group of leaders – the ‘Pol Pot-Ieng Sary Clique’ – for the 
corruption of Cambodian communism and the descent into genocidal 
madness. In more recent years this interpretation has become more nuanced 
in Tuol Sleng at least, where new exhibits explore the thoughts and 
motivations of low-level perpetrators as well as victims. The earlier, simplistic 
message about the culpability of a small clique of leaders has been opened 
up to a degree, and the full tragedy of the Cambodian trauma has been 
exposed in a way that is more shocking and distressing than the 
propagandistic treatment that characterised the site’s early interpretation, and 
that still characterises the interpretation at Choeung Ek. 
 
Nevertheless, the stark brutality of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek leave the 
visitor in no doubt that these are sites of commemoration of the victims of a 
great crime. In a sense Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek continue to bear witness 
to the crimes of the Khmer Rouge that largely continue to go unpunished, 
their raw exposure of the brutality of the Cambodian communists demanding 
some form of accountability. In a country where the history of the Khmer 
Rouge period is virtually not taught in schools, such sites can also play an 
extremely important public education role (Fawthrop and Jarvis, 2005: 146-
147; Kiernan, 2004). 
 
As places of interpretation and commemoration of the Khmer Rouge past the 
sites at Anlong Veng are far more problematic. Here Hun Sen’s strategy of 
‘reconciliation’ and ‘integration’ plays out in an utter failure of interpretation 
and a complete surrender of moral responsibility for commemoration of the 
past to the exigencies of development and reintegration of the Anlong Veng 
region into the nation.  
 
We are conscious here that our reading of the Anlong Veng sites diverges 
substantially from that of Timothy Dylan Wood (2006), who has perhaps spent 
more time than anyone studying the Anlong Veng area. Wood believes that 
the Ministry of Tourism views the tourist-historical sites at Anlong Veng as a 
resource for economic development of the town, and the reintegration of the 
area’s former Khmer Rouge soldiers and their families.2 However, at the same 
time, he argues, the Ministry seeks to impose ‘a singular, true representation 
of history as well as its (authentic) restoration/reconstruction’.  
 
The problem with this interpretation is the lack of evidence on the ground. The 
profound problem with Ta Mok’s house, with Pol Pot’s grave, is the lack of 
adequate interpretation, and the lack of control over the messages being 
conveyed at these sites. The visitor does not get a sense of victor’s history. 
The guides do not stick to the official narrative and there is no alternative 
source of interpretation: no signage, no leaflets, no guidebook. Can anyone 
imagine being given a guided tour of Hitler’s bunker by former SS soldiers and 
being told by them that Hitler was a good man because he got the trains 
running on time? Of course not. But that is, in effect, the closest parallel to 
what the visitor is expected to accept at Anlong Veng. 
 
Anlong Veng seems to us to demonstrate, not the government’s ‘keen ability 
to manage its former enemy’, as Wood claims, but the extent to which Hun 
Sen’s CPP regime has abandoned the search for justice and truth in order to 
achieve its version of reconciliation and peace. Integrating Anlong Veng into 
the nation through tourism development, with little attempt to control the 
interpretation of the area’s historic sites, serves Hun Sen’s purpose of 
bringing the former Khmer Rouge back into the national fold, but without any 
demand that they acknowledge guilt or pay penance. 
 
                                                 
2 Wood (2006: 5) reports that the area was once home to 16,000 Khmer Rouge troops and their 
families. 
The Hun Sen regime’s desire to achieve its version of reconciliation and 
peace is an important explanation of the disjuncture between what Wood sees 
as the Ministry of Tourism’s desire to control the interpretation of Anlong 
Veng’s historic sites and the reality of their interpretation. But there are other 
factors in operation here too. 
 
The failure of interpretation, as we see it, indicates the extent to which 
Cambodia remains, in fact, a fractured and fragmented country. Former 
Khmer Rouge leaders continue to exercise considerable power in a number of 
regions, and at all levels of government. Hun Sen’s strategy of ignoring 
individuals’ former activities with the Khmer Rouge so long as they now 
pledge allegiance to the CPP has encouraged this lack of accountability for 
past actions and the persistence of regional autonomy. While the Ministry of 
Tourism may have a clear sense of how it wants the Anlong Veng sites 
interpreted, its ability to implement its vision in a far-flung province inhabited 
by substantial numbers of former Khmer Rouge is obviously lacking. Lack of 
expertise and funding clearly also restrict the Ministry.  
 
One of the fundamental failures of interpretation practice demonstrated in 
Anlong Veng has to do with the lack of understanding of the difficulties 
associated with perpetrator sites as sites of commemoration. By ‘perpetrator 
sites’ we mean places associated purely or primarily with the perpetrators of 
pain and suffering – Hitler’s bunker, the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky in 
Moscow, Stalin’s dacha, Saddam’s palaces – rather than places associated 
with their victims – Auschwitz, Tuol Sleng, gulag camps, Robben Island, the 
Berlin Wall, to name a few. Given that all heritage practice involves the 
making of judgements about what is worthy of preservation and what stories 
are to be told through preservation, we see no difficulty in stating that if the 
purpose of heritage preservation in the case of places of pain and shame is to 
commemorate the victims, then there is little role for the preservation of 
perpetrator sites.  
 
We believe that the sites at Anlong Veng fall clearly into the category of 
perpetrator sites but that the parameters within which we must interpret their 
meaning are clear and agreed by virtually all parties: their relationship to the 
genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge. Do these sites further 
understanding of the Cambodian genocide or help in the commemoration of 
the victims? The answer, we believe, is no. There seems to be a clear 
understanding in other cases where commemoration of the victims of crimes 
of the nature and scale perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge is seen as the raison 
d’être of heritage preservation that perpetrator sites are inappropriate 
commemorative sites – Germany is the best example (Fulbrook, 2002). The 
failure to recognise this in Cambodia is the result of the confused approach to 
historical accountability and justice that filters from the top down (in fact, as 
Linton (2004) shows, many ordinary Cambodians are much less confused 
about the need for a proper accounting for the past than their political 
leaders).  
 
The failure also derives from poorly developed understandings of heritage 
interpretation and preservation practice. The problem in Anlong Veng is that 
the imperative of economic development through tourism has led to the hasty 
and ill-considered incorporation of historic sites into a heritage tourism 
strategy which Cambodia is not professionally equipped to manage. The 
national government’s desire to stimulate development in the Anlong Veng 
region and thus to reintegrate it into the nation is entirely laudable. However, 
the choice of tourism development as a primary strategy reveals the extent to 
which tourism has become embedded in international development thought as 
a panacea for developing countries. In fact, the reliance on tourism reflects 
the lack of legitimate development options open to struggling countries like 
Cambodia in the context of an international system strongly loaded against 
them, and the lack of innovative thinking and commitment to meaningful and 
sustainable development exhibited by political elites and international 
development organisations. The contrast with the treatment of Nazi-related 
sites in Germany demonstrates that even in the treatment of genocidal 
histories there are great disparities between the wealthy and the poor. 
 
The Anlong Veng sites raise some difficult questions about the purpose and 
nature of heritage interpretation and preservation. Contemporary 
interpretation practice, at least in the west, has tended towards the opening 
up of meanings, the rejection of didacticism and the promotion of multiple 
stories and self-discovery. But how appropriate is this approach in cases 
involving places of pain and shame? 
 
Wood seems to fall into the relativist trap with his concern for the voices of 
Anlong Veng locals to be heard in the interpretation of the Khmer Rouge sites: 
 
The Anlong Veng museum project provides a glimpse into the logic 
underlying aspects of government development initiatives. First, the 
processes by which the government and its various affiliates have 
amassed data and pursued representations (by tour guides) 
demonstrates the fixing of a particular narrative, operating as ‘truth’ and 
achieved at the expense of the perspectives and participation of locals 
who were actively involved with the ousted forces of Democratic 
Kampuchea (Wood, 2006:). 
 
The involvement of locals in development projects is quite appropriate in 
normal circumstances, as most international aid agencies now recognise. But 
this politically correct approach to development practice is simply 
inappropriate in the interpretation of the Anlong Veng sites. Why should 
interpretation take into account local perspectives if locals believe that Ta Mok 
and Pol Pot were good men? Do former Khmer Rouge have the right to have 
their understanding of history seriously considered in interpreting the 
Cambodian past? How are the perspectives of former Khmer Rouge to be 
weighed against the perspectives of other Cambodians who suffered not only 
because of the actions of the Khmer Rouge leaders, but of those Anlong Veng 
locals who followed those leaders? 
 
Our conclusion, which does not come easily to us as heritage professionals 
committed to our field and to the power of heritage as a force for 
remembrance, is that preservation of the Anlong Veng sites does little or 
nothing to further understanding or commemoration of Cambodia’s tragic and 
painful past. To wipe them from the heritage and tourism map would not be to 
encourage a culture of forgetting. Tuol Sleng and other such sites, together 
with the everyday reality of Cambodian trauma and, hopefully, the trials of the 
remaining leaders, ensure that the Khmer Rouge period will not be forgotten. 
Forgetting Anlong Veng’s Khmer Rouge sites, though, will contribute to a 
culture of true reconciliation by ensuring that the message about the Khmer 
Rouge period is clear and untrammelled by moral and historical relativism, by 
emphasising above all else the voices of the victims and silencing the 
perpetrators once and for all. 
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